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In Zoographies, Matthew Calarco offers an insightful analysis of anthropocentric 
trends in recent Continental philosophers Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Giorgio 
Agamben, and Jacques Derrida, combined with provocative suggestions for advancing 
beyond the Western tradition’s humanistic dead-end thinking on interspecies ethics. 
An introductory essay situates animal questions within Continental philosophy.  It 
grounds Calarco’s argument within the lineage of possibilities opened by Heidegger’s 
critique of modern metaphysical humanism and Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of an 
essentialist, reductionist “human-animal” binary, and it presents two main theses: that the 
Continental tradition is pervasively and detrimentally anthropocentric and that the 
human-animal distinction can and should be abandoned to clear the way for more 
genuine encounters with other animal species and promote their more appropriate 
philosophical and political treatment.  He contextualizes his argument with references to 
prominent pro-animal philosophical trends, distinguishing his approach from that of some 
types of “identity politics,” by which progressive agendas are divided and vitiated, and 
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from those approaches that rely too heavily on a notion of subjectivity that has 
problematic blind spots and metaphysical baggage.  Unlike Levinas, Slavoj Žižek, and 
Alain Badiou, who attempt to rethink subjectivity in the wake of Heideggerian and 
Derridean critiques, Calarco declares his suspicion with ethical and political structures 
erected on this basis, most of which remain problematically anthropocentric. 
The first chapter charts the ways Heidegger distinguishes between human beings 
and other animal species, from his distinction between animal perishing and human death 
in Being and Time to that between linguistically capable humans and non-linguistic 
animals in the “Letter on Humanism,” paying particular attention to a 1929-30 lecture 
course in which Heidegger designates non-human animals as “world-poor” and incapable 
of recognizing entities “as such.”  After clearly presenting the main points of Heidegger’s 
analyses, Calarco begins to question them, looking at, for example, the reductionistic way 
Heidegger talks of “the being of the animal” as if “animality” designates a monolithic 
structure and not a huge diversity of beings with different kinds of experience, some of 
which seem quite phenomenologically rich in ways to which Heidegger fails to attend.  
Though he credits Heidegger with undermining traditional human-animal hierarchies and 
at least attempting to understand animals on their own terms, Calarco shows that 
Heidegger’s priorities remain anthropocentric inasmuch as Heidegger never really 
engages animal experience as a primary interest, but always as a means of highlighting 
the uniqueness of human experience and the kinds of worldly relationships of which, 
allegedly, only humans are capable. 
Following the figure of the animal in Heidegger’s later writings, Calarco 
questions Heidegger’s placement of Nietzsche and Rilke as final thinkers who merely 
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exhausted the possibilities of metaphysical humanism without transcending the basic 
framework.  He argues, with supporting references to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy 
on “becoming-animal,” that Nietzsche and Rilke hold much more promise for post-
humanist and post-anthropocentric philosophy than Heidegger recognizes.   
The chapter provides both an efficient summary of Heidegger’s thinking and 
forceful challenges to it.  Calarco describes possible detours around Heideggerian 
impasses, beginning to explore what it means to consider non-human animal beings 
without deploying a clean conceptual line between human and animal being, either in 
traditional metaphysical form or Heideggerian existential reinscriptions. 
Subsequent chapters follow suit.  The second, dealing with the writings of 
Emmanuel Levinas, charts two related anthropocentric gestures in Levinas’s thinking, the 
denial that non-human animals can experience themselves as subject to an Other’s ethical 
demand and respond altruistically, and the denial that they can truly provoke this kind of 
altruistic response in human beings, arguing that the logic of Levinas’s account of ethics 
justifies neither claim. 
He begins by recounting Levinas’s story about “Bobby,” a stray dog who lived for 
a while near a Nazi prison camp in which Levinas was held, who earned from Levinas 
the title of “last Kantian in Nazi Germany” for his (sort of) willingness to engage the 
prisoners as subjects deserving respect while their human captors had debased them to 
the status of inhuman objects.  This is the closest Levinas comes to admitting any kind of 
non-human ethical agency, and he eventually dismisses Bobby with the conclusion that 
the dog is not really Kantian because he “lacked the brain needed to universalize 
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maxims.”1  In contrast, Calarco embraces the possibility that Bobby embodies some 
brand of ethical or proto-ethical agency, arguing that whether one explains altruism with 
a “selfish gene” theory or interprets it at the individual psychological level, Darwinian 
biological continuism and recent cognitive ethology undermine Levinas’s anthropocentric 
claims that only humans act altruistically. 
Calarco then illustrates Levinas’s claims in Totality and Infinity that the Other 
who imposes ethical demands must be human, before presenting Levinas’s maddening 
equivocations, when in an interview, he maintains absolute human priority on one hand, 
while on the other making limited (“One cannot entirely refuse the face of the animal.”) 
and agnostic (“I cannot say at what moment you have the right to be called a ‘face.’ I 
don’t know if a snake has a face.”) admissions that could allow an interspecies extension 
of his ethical framework. 
Building upon the idea of agnosticism, Calarco suggests that one might remain 
faithful to the basic Levinasian structure in which ethics involves having one’s ego 
displaced by an encounter that moves one to responsibility, while remaining open to the 
possibility that such an encounter might occur in ways other than those that serve as 
Levinas’s main examples; one might, for example, be moved by qualities other than the 
Other’s destitution, respond in ways other than giving “with both hands,” and be 
provoked by something non-human.  Calarco proposes a quasi-Levinasian ethical 
agnosticism that refuses final answers to the question of who or what can impose ethical 
demands and provides an alternative to the recent – and mistaken – philosophical 
obsession with delimiting the criteria of ethical considerability, an activity that, even 
                                                 
1Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom, trans. Sean Hand (London: The Althone Press, 1990), 153. 
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when pursued by those sympathetic to animal concerns, is philosophically and politically 
dubious. 
Calarco closes the chapter by smartly defending his decision to write a book about 
animal ethics at all, responding to the possible objection that the agnosticism he defends 
calls for casting a wider net and not limiting the discussion to animals.  His impassioned 
plea stresses that addressing specific questions about non-human animals is required to 
disrupt the tradition’s entrenched and harmful metaphysical anthropocentrism and to stop 
the horrors of the modern meat and research machines, and he suggests that his approach 
might help resolve certain disciplinary skirmishes between pro-animal thinkers, 
environmentalists, ecofeminists, etc. 
In the third chapter, Calarco maps the question of the animal through the writings 
of Giorgio Agamben.  It begins with this author’s early contentions that the Western 
philosophical tradition, including Heidegger, remains bound by thinking about the 
specificity of human experience and the human-animal relationship only in negative 
terms, as when it locates the key moments in the transition from non-linguistic, non-
political animals to linguistic and political human beings in a mystical, ineffable Voice 
that transcends animality but has not or can not be linguistically articulated. 
Calarco then delineates Agamben’s attempts to think of these moments and of this 
transition in more positive terms.  He explores the difference between the modern 
solipsistic and pre-social view of the self and Agamben’s picture of the self as a linguistic 
construct.  He also considers the contrast between the traditional idea that humans “have 
language” while non-human animals do not and Agamben’s view that non-human 
animals are fundamentally and totally immersed in language, while humans are 
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fundamentally deprived of language, beginning in a pre-linguistic state of infancy, 
marked by openness to the specifically human forms of history, culture, and politics that 
language eventually confers.  Thus, Calarco shows that while Agamben attempts to think 
differently about the roots and implications of the essential distinction between 
specifically human modes of being and modes shared with non-human animals, his early 
work is part of a tradition for which the general need to delineate and separate is 
unquestioned.  As with Heidegger and Levinas, Calarco suggests that empirical ethology 
undermines Agamben’s neat lines of demarcation, and he questions Agamben’s apparent 
assumptions that only humans are linguistic and political creatures and that the political 
realm only includes humans. 
The remainder of the chapter focuses on Agamben’s more recent work to 
illustrate Agamben's increasing attention to problems that accompany attempts to cleanly 
distinguish the human from the animal.  Here, Agamben contends that such delineations 
lie at the root of many interhuman political problems insofar as exclusion and oppression 
proceed on the back of a human / animal distinction, where certain qualities are identified 
as “animal” and then attributed to the marginalized human group to justify their 
subordination.  Building on this, Calarco draws on Agamben’s idea of the 
“anthropological machine” to indicate the structures that must be dismantled on the way 
to a more relational ontology and a more inclusive political order. 
The final chapter begins with an outline of the importance of animal questions for 
Jacques Derrida, starting with a lucid and succinct presentation of how deconstruction 
works with the human-animal distinction—a point to which Derrida returned 
repeatedly—illuminating how the human-animal binary opposition obscures differences, 
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pretending to recognize two cleanly and simply differentiated homogenous groups in 
what is actually a plethora of different types of being. 
Following this presentation of Derrida’s deconstructive critique, Calarco explores 
Derrida’s more positive (but not fully articulated or developed) ethical and political 
strategies.  Inspired by Derrida’s discussion of scientific and horticultural abuses, a 
powerful section explores the value of comparing the mind-boggling amounts of violence 
practiced in factory farming with the Holocaust, arguing that to deny a priori any 
possibility that the two situations should be compared on the grounds that humans 
deserve special standing simply by virtue of species membership is to commit an 
anthropocentric fallacy that withstands neither scientific nor ethical critique. 
The next section analyzes the “proto-ethical” demand that precedes moral 
assessments and political policies, presenting the way Derrida reads Jeremy Bentham’s 
famous question, “Can they suffer?” to highlight not shared capacity among human and 
non-human animals, per the traditional interpretation, but, in line with a Levinasian 
dynamic, a shared incapacity and experience of susceptibility to suffering affliction.  This 
is followed by an analysis of Derrida’s ruminations on an encounter during which his cat 
saw him naked to show that the kinds of self-reflection and responsibility that proto-
ethical encounters command is provoked not only by exposure to the other animal’s 
suffering, but by revelations of other qualities as well, such as inscrutability or 
cognizance. 
In contrast with thinkers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, who advocate 
extending established humanistic ethical systems to include non-human animals, Calarco 
opens the next section by affirming Derrida’s suspicion as to the efficacy of existing 
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moral and political frameworks for handling and promoting the kinds of ethical 
imperatives at stake in inter-species relationships—these frameworks being tainted by 
problematic notions of subjectivity, dubious value hierarchies, and a compulsion for 
exclusionary line-drawing.  Drawing on Derrida’s idea of “carnophallologocentrism,” 
Calarco construes these modern humanist juridical and exclusionary elements as “quasi-
invisible constraints” that preclude the kinds of ontological and ethical considerations 
that interspecies relationships require, marking a failure of imagination that mistakenly 
attempts to extend a system that should be cast aside. 
With reference to Derrida’s article “Eating Well,” this section includes a 
penetrating analysis of the status of vegetarianism with reference to deconstruction.  
Here, Calarco problematizes any good conscience one might hope to achieve by adopting 
vegetarianism, emphasizing both the stricter demands of veganism and the fact that any 
currently possible human diet in modern industrial society will involve harm to animal 
life—a situation requiring not a simple decision that allows complacency, but a 
continually vigilant striving for an ideal, the full realization of which is ruled out from the 
start. 
In the final section of the chapter, Calarco notes that even after Derrida, the 
tentacles of anthropocentrism reach broadly through numerous disciplines and 
institutions, requiring extensive historical and genealogical analysis.  He argues that 
while Derrida’s work is helpful for showing that the limit between humanity and 
animality is not as sharp or simply drawn as the tradition would like to think, it is limited 
by its retention of line drawing (albeit more tentative and complex) and ultimately fails to 
decisively challenge the metaphysical anthropocentrism of the Western tradition, offering 
 8
Between the Species, IX, August 2009, http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 
nothing to replace the reductive binary human-animal opposition that Derrida so 
thoroughly problematizes.  In the forceful closing pages, Calarco outlines an alternative 
ontological vision, inspired by Nietzschean and Deleuzean materialism, to rival the 
traditional human / animal distinction that Derrida frustratingly refuses to abandon, 
driving home the central thesis that the human-animal distinction should be surrendered 
for the benefit of other animals. 
Calarco’s book has much to offer a broad range of readers.  The author has a gift 
for explaining complex ideas clearly, so that readers unschooled in these thinkers but 
sympathetic to their broader phenomenological, cultural, and ethical trends can follow the 
argument; he also explains things concisely, so as not to be tedious for readers who are 
more familiar with the material.  With unwavering focus, he illuminates the many ways 
that anthropocentrism runs, sometimes subtly, through recent Continental philosophy, 
and he offers insightful and creative suggestions for modes of thought and practice that 
exceed these anthropocentric limitations.  Throughout the work, Calarco skillfully 
bridges the gaps between Continental and analytic philosophy, situating his points with 
reference to prominent lines of utilitarian and rights-based Anglo-American pro-animal 
approaches, and between philosophy and other disciplines, supporting his arguments with 
biology, cognitive ethology, and the kinds of scientific empirical references that are 
sometimes missing in philosophical speculation. 
On a critical note, though part of the book’s success is its succinctness, certain 
arguments might have been strengthened had Calarco analyzed a few additional texts, 
such as certain of Heideggerian lecture courses before Being and Time, where he 
describes animal worlds, including that of the snail, in ways that might have further 
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illuminated Calarco’s observance that Heidegger’s work becomes increasingly severe in 
positing abyssal ruptures between human and non-human animal being.  He might also 
have considered some of Levinas’s (especially later) work dealing with theology, given 
the role of such concerns in fueling Levinas’s humanism.  In a related point, while 
Calarco’s summaries of basic ideas and terminology in the authors he investigates are 
clear and informative, occasionally a term is introduced that might have been well served 
with additional explanation and contextualization; for example, “onto-theology” and the 
figure of the “event” are introduced in a way that seems to assume an audience familiar 
with how these ideas function in the thinkers who use them, but many readers might need 
more information to fully absorb the strong points Calarco makes along these lines. 
These minor considerations do not undermine the general success of Calarco’s 
impressive work but perhaps suggest additional valuable paths to pursue, by which his 
compelling arguments might be extended and deepened.  In any event, the clearly and 
passionately argued Zoographies is a definitive exposition of the anthropocentrism in the 
philosophers it discusses.  An important addition to the vigorous discussion of animality 
taking place in contemporary Continental philosophy, it suggests implications for a range 
of disciplines involved in the burgeoning fields that constitute current animal studies. 
